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THE IMPACT OF PRESSURE GROUPS ON THE
LEGISLATIVE PROCESS*
DANIEL J. DYKSTRAt
The outstanding political phenomenon of the past two decades
has been the increased and increasing assumption of power
and control by government, both federal and state, over the
economic affairs of the nation. While this extension would
probably have resulted in time simply as the evolutionary
product of a more interdependent society, it was accelerated
considerably by the economic paralysis of the early thirties
and by the second World War. These catastrophic events neces-
sitated, at least, so it was generally believed, the active inter-
vention of government in social economic affairs in a variety
of capacities. The result was that the forces which make up
the economic whole, the producers, the distributors, the con-
sumers, found that a power heretofore more or less content to
participate as an observer was now playing a major and active
role in the control and development of their affairs.
As was to be expected, this new role could not be played
without numerous and continuing repercussions. Not the least
of these reactions was and is the intensification in the struggle
of multitudinous and diverse special interest groups to have
their voices heard and their requests acted upon favorably by
those who guide the destinies of the legislature, the executive,
and the judiciary., While our society has always witnessed
* The writer wishes to acknowledge that the references to the pressure
activities engaged in by the lumber interests of Wisconsin in the post
Civil War period were findings based on a study made possible by a grant
from the Wisconsin Communities Studies Fund established by the Rocke-
feller Foundation. This study was supervised by Professor Willard
Hurst of the University of Wisconsin.
t Associate Professor of Law, University of Utah.
1. In a general interim report the majority members of the "House Select
Committee on Lobbying Activities," popularly known as the "Buchanan
Committee," observed: "Certain aspects of lobbying's recent development
were particularly responsible for the creation of this committee in August
1949. Primarily among these was the fact that the sheer weight of group pres-
sures has increased enormously during and subsequent to the Second
World War, reaching an unprecedented peak during the Eightieth Congress.
In a very real sense, the impact of war solidly established lobbying as a
major industry. Our national effort, entailing as it did far-reaching con-
trols over the entire economy, prompted a hitherto unequalled mobilization
of group interests of every conceivable kind." H. R. REP. No. 3138, 81st
Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1950).
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and even encouraged demands from its economic components,
it is submitted that those who now seek to assert their influence
are impelled by a sense of urgency, in truth a desperateness
which at times borders on hysteria, not present in previous
conflicts. Those who engineer the battles for privileges recognize
that a revolutionary change in government's relation to the
social economic structure has occurred and that as a consequence
the stakes for which they are fighting are higher, more vital.2
They are cognizant in other words not only that the increased
assumption of control by government makes the rewards of
effective influence potentially greater, but also that this same
development makes ineffectiveness potentially more costly. They
accept, though reluctantly, the fact that the current position
of government is not a temporary one, that it will continue to
play a major, if not dominating, role in shaping our economy.
For these reasons they believe that they are combatants in a
battle for survival, and they fight with an intensity which in
itself is evidence of the sincerity of their belief.
Shrewd observers of this struggle are perturbed by its
fierceness and its implications. Professor Hurst in his excellent
treatise, The Growth of Amerian Law, has given voice to
such concern. Because he accepts John C. Calhoun's theory
which held, in Mr. Hurst's words, that "The central job of law
was to bring power into balance sufficiently so that particular
blocs could not run roughshod over other interests in society,"3
he is acutely aware of the stresses and strains placed on law
making bodies in our society. As Professor Hurst observed:
By 1950 it was apparent that these currents had moved
far enough to call into question the capacity of our main
legal institutions to mediate .... Organized spokesmen for
industry, commerce, labor, and agriculture wielded a prac-
tical veto on measures adverse to their separate concerns,
or at least had enough force to modify pending public mea-
2. In discussing current aspects of lobbying, the interim report issued
by the Buchanan Committee stated: "Not only was there a sharp increase
in the number of groups intent on influencing government, but their effort
was also more intense, more diversified, and more effectively financed than
it had ever been before. Here again, the impact of the war was basic; for
with profits, wages, and taxes running at unprecedentedly high levels it was
nothing more than good business to spend freely to protect one's self from
adverse legislation or administrative rulings-particularly when the costs
were chargeable to 'operating expenses.'" Ibid.
3. HURST, THE GROWTH OF AMERICAN LAW, 440 (Little, Brown and Co.,
1950).
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sures closer to their liking. They used their veto frankly
and bluntly in their own interests, and not as trustees for
a broader public. In positive action they displayed precisely
the danger that Calhoun foresaw, the formation of majori-
ties which expressed not an agreement upon the general in-
terest, but merely a sum of temporary alliances of special
interests. The forces in the society which drove in direc-
tions away from the central core of common concerns
seemed steadily to gain strength relative to the forces that
drove towards the center. As blocs pushed their particular
programs in legislative chambers, they made a picture of a
society which seemed less like a structure of interlocking,
mutually supporting parts, than like billiard balls on a
table, knocking against each other and rolling apart from
the impact, to hit and rebound from others."
The majority members of the House Committee which re-
cently conducted an investigation of lobbying activities lent
support to Professor Hurst's analysis when in a general interim
report they observed:
As stated ... one of the central purposes of government
is that people should be able to come to it; in our system,
lobbying has been a principal means by which this can be
done. But at the same time it is important to ask whether
our kind of popular government can indefinitely absorb
the impact of an inherently expansive system of organized
pressure; whether we can continue to afford the social
cleavages, the clusters of private power of which this
mounting pressure is both cause and symptom. This is no
abstruse problem in political theory. The way in which
these questions are resolved is the key to our institutional
future0
These observations, expressing as they do the concensus of
contemporary political thought, challenge our society to take
increased cognizance of the existence, the power, the conse-
quences of economic groupism. Whereas the need for such
recognition and appraisal is general, the necessity for self
information and soul searching in respect to this political
4. Id. at 443.
5. This committee was known as the House Select Committee on Lobby-
ing Activities. It was created by the 81st Congress pursuant to a resolu-
tion passed in August, 1949. (H. REs. 298). Members of the committee
were Representatives Buchanan (D., Pa.), Lanhan (D., Ga.), Albert (D.,
Olda.), Doyle (D., Calif.), Halleck (R., Ind.), Brown (R., Ohio), and
O'Hara (R., Minn.). For a good analysis of the operations of this com-
mittee, see Comment 18 U. OF CHL L. Rnv. 647 (1951).
6. H. R. REP. No. 3138, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1950).
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phenomenon should be felt especially by those of us who are
members of the legal profession. With understandable pride
we repeatedly point to the fact that we contribute proportion-
ately more personnel than any other group to the law making
bodies of this nation.T The same is true in respect to the
administrative branch and of course we possess a virtual mono-
poly over the judiciary. Such representation alone would be
enough to place upon us the primary responsibility for seeking
to assay the methods and influence of current patterns of
economic power, but another, more personal, reason exists as
to why the legal profession cannot in smug indifference watch
the increased activities of various and numerous pressure
groups. That reason is that frequently the organizing genius
and influence behind a given pressure group and the voice that
is heard pleading its cause is that of a member of the legal
profession. In truth, it has been alleged, that this voice is
sometimes that of the organized bar
These factors mean that either knowingly or unknowingly
the legal profession is playing a major role in the battle for
7. In 1940 Charles S. Hyneman, professor of political science at Louisi-
ana State University (since 1947, professor of political science at North-
western University) published the results of a study which he made re-
lating to the occupations of the legislators of 13 states for the years 1924
to 1934. In his observations he noted that in seventeen chambers lawyers
were the most numerous while in the remaining eight they were second
or third in importance. Prof. Hyneman further observed that lawyers held
more chairmanships than any other occupational group in twenty of the
twenty-five chambers which he analyzed. These facts caused him to con-
clude that truly "the lawyer is (the) representative for all population
groups." Hyneman, 55 PoL. ScI. Q. 556, note especially pages 558, 562,
564 (1940).
8. In a monograph which he prepared for the Temporary National
Economic Committee on pressure groups, Donald C. Blaisdell, economic
consultant for the committee observed: "If the Chamber of Commerce is
the spokesman at Washington for American business, its special pleader
before Government and people is the American Bar Association. Collec-
tively, the association rarely lobbies for or against a particular bill, al-
though in 1937 it made no secret of its pressure activities against Presi-
dent Roosevelt's Supreme Court reorganization plan. From the point of
view of business control of Government, the Bar Association is important,
aside from the obvious value of its membership as individual lawyers to
business, because it has assumed the role of trustee of American institu-
tions. It is in this latter sense that its influence is felt beyond Washington,
extending over the country and redounding, on the whole, to the advantage
of business." BLAISDELL, ECONOMIC POWER AND POLITICAL PRESSUREs 37
(TNEC Monograph 26, 1941).
For a further comment on the lawyer as a representative of pressure
groups see: Mechling, Washington Lobbies Threaten Democracy, 22 VA.
QUARTERLY REV. 321, at p. 341 (1946).
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influence in government. As a consequence it behooves us to
step back and observe in broad perspective the weapons, the
maneuvers, and to some extent evaluate the consequences, in-
herent and actual, in our current patterns of organized pressure.
While this approach admittedly omits concrete suggestions for
a solution, it is submitted that information on and a recognition
of the problem precedes the remedy. It is also submitted
that perhaps a realistic awareness of the modus operandi of
economic groups is in itself the best guarantee against abuse.
Before describing this modus operandi a few general observa-
tions should be made. First of all it should be clearly under-
stood that it is not the purpose of this article to condemn
promiscuously those forces which see fit to exert their influence
upon government.9 Economic groupism is part and parcel
of our social economic life. In fact, therein lies our current
political paradox, for, as Professor Jaffe has pointed out, our
constitutions and philosophies are geared to a territorical rep-
resentation of individual citizens while in reality the "most
significant and powerful components of the social structure
are economic groups" which are not confined to and cannot
be represented on an individual or geographic basis.10 It should
further be observed that this article recognizes that it is neces-
sary for the government to meet certain of the demands ad-
vocated by various collective voices in our society. As has been
observed:
Stability and repose are imperatives of government, and
without minimum group satisfactions they may not endure.
9. In this connection the observations of Dr. Hadley Cantril, professor
of psychology and director of the office of public opinion research, Prince-
ton University, are in point. Testifying before the Buchanan Committee,
Cantril stated: "Now I would say that pressure groups and lobbies are
obviously an inevitable coproduct of our form of Government....
It is therefore, of course, completely unrealistic and naive to condemn
lobbying activities wholesale. Whether they are good or bad depends upon
our own particular point of view, what the lobbyist is up to. From the
point of view of the student of public opinion, it seems to me that the
practical problem boils down to two questions.
First, to what extent do lobbyists represent the public, whether this
public is taken on a Nation-wide basis or a State basis or on the basis
of a congressional district, and second, to what extent do the lobbyists
actually faithfully reflect the views of the particular interest group
they claim to be representing." Part 1 of Hearings Before House Select
Committee on Lobbying Activities, 81st Cong., 2nd Sess. 20 (1950).
10. Jaffe, Law Making by Private Groups, 51 HAnv. L. Rnv. 201-202(1937); also see Comment, California's New Lobby Control Act, 38 CALiF.
L. Rav. 478 (1950).
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Where yesterday this fact was glossed with rhetoric, today
the naked exposure and intensification of group alignment
has made this rhetoric tasteless. Congress and the state
legislature pass laws for the farmer, laws for labor, laws
for business.11
Accepting then the inevitable fact of organized pressures
formed primarily on economic lines, let us turn the spotlight
on the devices these forces have developed to make themselves
effective.
It is somewhat common among those who have sought to
describe these techniques to infer that today's operational ap-
proach to influence is considerably different from what it was
in the post Civil War era. These analysts refer, for example,
to the "old lobby" and the "new lobby" as if to suggest that
little in common exists between the two. 2 In its broadest
concept this observation is warranted, but from a narrower
aspect this suggested differentiation is not to be taken too
literally. A study of the methods by which the lumber inter-
ests operating in the 1870's and 1880's made their wishes known
and their influence felt reveals that direct "personal contact"
was the most effective weapon in their arsenal.13 A reading
of the reports issued by the Buchanan Committee will show
beyond question that "personal contact" remains the primary
approach to dividends.14 Contemporary groups it would seem
accept as truth the observation of one of their spokesmen when
he said:
The way to get bills tluough is to go up and grab the
fellows and talk to them. A speech never changed a vote
yet. It's a matter of political strategy. Take the leaders
and sell 'em.15
11. Jaffe, Law Making by Private Groups, 51 HARV. L. REV. 201, 202-203
(1937).
12. See BLAISDELL, ECONOMIC POWER AND POLITICAL PREssuRts, 3
(TNEC Monograph 26, 1941); Note, The Federal Lobbying Act of 1946, 47
COL. L. REV. 98 (1947); Comment, Improving the Legislative Process, 56
YALE L. J. 304 (1947).
13. For examples of legislative hearings and committee reports which
reveal lobby techniques of the post Civil War period see: Wis. ASSMIBLY J.,
appendix (1872).
14. For illustrations see: H. R. REP. No. 3138, 81st Cong., 2d Sess.;
H. R. 3233, 81st Cong., 2d Sess.; Hearings, supra note 9.
15. Coffin, No Speech Ever Changed a Vote, 117 NEW REPUBLIC 16
(July 14, 1947) the quotation is allegedly a statement made by Byron
Wilson, lobbyist for the National Wool Growers' Association.
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Because direct personal contact remains the most effective
approach, interviews, dinners with legislators, special favors,
and the extension of numerous courtesies continue to play
prominent roles in the patterns of making the demands of special
groups reflect themselves in legislative and administrative action.
The personal contact technique also explains unquestionably why
many ex-legislators and former administrators are retained to
serve as representatives of special groups. 16 Their "know-how"
as to the ways of government and their relationships with those
in a position of authority understandably make them valuable
assets to those forces that are requesting a little added con-
sideration from their government.
Just as "personal contact" in its various forms remains an
essential characteristic of modern pressure tactics, so also
does the practice of having special groups prepare their own
bills for eventual transmission to the legislature. In the period
of economic expansion witnessed by the latter half of the
nineteenth century, it was common for railroads, corporations,
lumber companies, mining concerns when interested in certain
grants, subsidies, or special franchises to have counsel draft
the necessary bill and then to have "their legislative representa-
tives" introduce this bill to the law makers. 17 Today special
groups follow this same technique and consequently many laws
now on the statute books were first drafted and tailored by and
for economic blocs seeking to obtain certain benefits. 8
16. For comment on use of former congressmen and administrators by
pressure groups, see: Mechling, Washington Lobbies Threaten Democracy,
22 VA. QUARTERLY REV. 321 (1946) ; an editorial in the New Republic for
March 7, 1949 stated that among the lobbyists registered under the lobby
registration act were five ex-senators and 12 en-representatives. 120 NEw
REPUBLIC 7, (March 7, 1949).
17. A study of the "private" and local laws passed on behalf of lumber
companies in Wisconsin from 1865 to 1873 revealed that in nearly every
instance the companies selected one of a small group of Legislators to
introduce their bills.
18. The following observation contained in a note published in the
Columbia Law Review is in point: "The initiative for the great mass of
statutes enacted by legislatures each year rarely comes from the legislators.
Indeed, legislators have been likened to courts, with 'plaintiffs, urging
changes, and defendants protesting against the injury which will be done
them by the change.' These 'plaintiffs' and 'defendants' may be govern-
mental agencies or departments, official organizations such as law revision
commissions or the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, or private
pressure groups represented by lobbyists." Note, Nonlegislative Intent as
an Aid to Statutory Interpretation, 49 COL. L. Rnv. 676 (1949). The
analogy contained in the preceding quotation is properly credited to
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The introduction of these measures is not, incidentally, a
matter to be taken for granted. Various interest groups properly
appreciate the fact that not all the myriad demands made upon
the legislature will find their way into the legislative hopper.
Because this is true, these groups rightfully value the legislator
who is willing to give official voice to their wishes.19 Also be-
cause this is true certain factions have found it desirable to
draft contingent contracts, where not expressly declared illegal, 20
which commit them to pay a certain sum to their lobbyist if he
succeeds in having a desired bill placed before the legislature.2
The fact that much legislation does not originate within
legislative chambers or even under the supervision of law mak-
ers, but is instead drafted and given impetus by special groups,
gives rise to important questions of judicial policy. While it is
not the purpose of this article to enter into a discussion of these
problems, their significance warrants enumeration. Should
judges recognize the true origin of measures obviously drafted
by a special bloc in order that these acts may more accurately
be construed in keeping with their objectives and with legisla-
tive intent? Should courts take note of the birthplace of such
legislation in ascertaining whether they should construe such
statutes "strictly" or "liberally"? Should judges recognize the
political facts of life for purposes of enabling them consciously
CHAMBERLAIN, LEGISLAkTIVE PROcEssEs: NATIONAL AND STATE 64 (1st ed.
1936).
For specific reference to the preparation of measures, by a non-legisla-
tive group, for submission to the legislature see the report devoted to the
activities of the U.S. Savings and Loan League, issued by the House
Committee on Lobbying Activities. H. R. REP. No. 3139, 81st Cong., 2dSess. (1950).
19. A reading of the Buchanan Committee reports reveals that most
organizations have a certain small group of legislators upon whom they
call to do their bidding in respect to the introduction of the measures
they desired to have submitted.
20. Twenty-one states at the present time expressly ban contingent
fees for lobbying purposes. See statement by Congressman Frank
Buchanan, Part .; of Hearings Before House Select Committee on Lobbying
ttrities, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 17 (1950).
21. In this connection the following extract from a letter sent by the
chairman of the Twenty Percent Cabaret Tax Committee to the person
who subsequently represented them is revealing and interesting: "I am
authorized as chairman of the 20 Percent Cabaret Tax Committee pursuant
to a meeting held at the Sherman Hotel on March 9, 1948, at which time
this committee was organized by a group of hotels affected by this tax.
We will furnish you from time to time revised list of the members of
this committee. A list of the members as of this date is attached hereto.
In accordance with our agreement, you are to be paid a retainer of
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1951/iss3/2
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to play the role of economic moderator ?22 It is submitted that
the manner in which these questions are resolved will determine
to a considerable extent the role which the judiciary will play in
shaping our economic course in the years that lie ahead.
Returning to a consideration of the similarities between the
methods and objectives of the economic forces of the 1870's
and those of today, it is significant to note that the pressure
elements of the earlier age recognized, as do their present-day
counterparts, the significance of having "friends of cause" placed
in strategic administrative positions. In Wisconsin, for example,
the lumber inspectors appointed by the Governor to supervise
timber transactions in each of several districts were men of con-
siderable authority, and as a consequence loggers and mill
owners constantly vied with one another in an effort to secure
the appointments of individuals sympathetic to their respective
positions. The aid of "solid party workers" and the influence
of "friends of the Governor" were sought by each group in their
anxiety to have the "right men" named as lumber inspectors.
Scores of letters containing reminders of previous favors ren-
dered by their authors and begging him to appoint their
nominee were sent to the Governor each time a vacancy oc-
curred.23 How similar are these activities to current struggles
$10,000 and, in addition, the sum of $15,000 for expenses in order to bring
to the attention of the Congress of the United States the necessity of a
reduction in this cabaret tax.
In the event you are successful in bringing this matter to Congress'
attention by an amendment, rider, or proposed legislation, there will be
advanced to you an additional sum of $25,000 for expenses to further guide
and assist in any manner which you deem necessary the successful passage
of this legislation on both the floor of the House of Representatives and
the S~nate of the United States.
In further accordance with our agreement, in the event you are success-
ful in having passed legislation that will reduce the cabaret tax from the
present 20 percent to 10 percent you are to be paid the sum of $35,000 for
your services. In the event the tax is reduced to 5 percent, you are to be
paid the sum of $50,000.
You are admonished to conduct the lobbying of this legislation in strict
accordance with the laws and regulations of this country and to hold in
valued respect the members of this committee that you are representing."
Id. at 8.
22. For a provocative comment on the questions raised see: Note, Non-
legislative Intent as an Aid to Statutory Interpretation, 49 CoL. L. Rsv.
676 (1949).
23. Numerous illustrations may be found in the Wisconsin Executive
Records on file at the Wisconsin Historical Library, Madison, Wisconsin.
See especially the set consisting of two boxes which contain correspondence
concerning and from lumber inspectors.
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to have men with "proper views" placed on the Inter-State
Commerce Commission, The Federal Trade Commission, the
Federal Communications Commission and on the innumerable
other agencies and bureaus which daily touch the welfare of
many economic groups.2' While in the main popular attention
has been directed towards pressure groups in relation to legisla-
tive activities, economic interests with understandable eagerness
and with considerable success have concentrated in many in-
stances their energies on administrative agencies. These in-
terests well understand that the scope given to legislation,
the strictness or laxity of its enforcement, in fact its entire
efficacy rests in the hands of those entrusted with administrative
authority.
The observations contained in the preceding paragraphs in-
dicate that in primary objectives and in many essential tech-
niques there is much in common between those who sought to
exert their influence on government fifty to seventy-five years
ago and modern pressure groups. If earlier methods were occa-
sionally touched with unbecoming coarseness and bluntness, and
were too often tainted with fraud, it may discreetly be mentioned
that modern history is not without its stories of "influence
peddling" and purchased favoritism. It is also safe to observe
that then as now the usual approach was direct and dignified,
conducted by men sincerely convinced for the most part that
their interests were in the interests of all.
This comparison of pressure tactics should not, however, be
carried too far. In a very significant sense there is a considerable
contrast between current sources and methods of influence and
those of yesterday, and in this very contrast lies the necessity for
taking increased cognizance of economic groupism in the mid-
twentieth century. Not only does today's setting provide a
more fertile hunting ground for influence, for as noted the
weight and interest of government cuts more deeply into social
economic relationships than heretofore, but also the increased
interdependence of all forces in society has resulted in a welding
of these forces into economic blocs possessing greater, more
24. For an example, see a brief account of the manner in which railroad
companies brought pressure to bear to defeat the appointment of Thomas
R. Amlie, former congressman from Wisconsin, to the I. C. C., see,
BLAISDELL, ECONOMIC POWER AND POLITIcAL PREssums, 61-62 (TNEC Mono-
graph 26, 1941).
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insistent and virulent voices than have heretofore been heard
on the American scene. Herein lies the difference.
The pleas raised in demand in the 1870's and 1880's were
essentially, although there were exceptions, e.g. the railroads, the
grange, the cries of individuals, or of those representing the
wishes of a single business entity, or at best of those who
spoke for but a small group of entrepreneurial interests. This
was understandable, for economic considerations were primarily
local and thus a mass consciousness of interdependence was yet
largely unborn. While within given geographic areas special
groups were formed to raise their voices collectively,25 organiza-
tions on a national scale were either non-existent or were yet
to emerge from infancy. The efforts to secure favors from the
government, though not without effectiveness, were essentially
uncoordinated and were in most instances directed by a single
corporation, or by a local unit of the economy, rather than by an
entire industry or a significant portion thereof.
Today, how different is the source of influence. Businessmen,
laborers, farmers, veterans, teachers, lawyers, doctors, bankers,
home owners, beauticians, and so on ad infinitum, have all
learned the value of organization, not only on a local scale, but
on a national scale. 26 The story is an endless one, for organiza-
tions breed organizations, and in an age of collectively focused
influence the pleas of the unorganized are like voices crying in
the wilderness. The supplications now heard are no longer
those of individuals or of local business units, but they emanate
from an organized segment or segments of our political economy.
Thus, it is, for example, true that the American Medical Associa-
tion with considerable success wages battles for the doctors
of the land; the CIO and A. F. of L. plead labor's cause and
brings labor's influence to bear; the Farm Bureau speaks for the
farmers; and the National Association of Real Estate Boards
mobilizes the collective influence of those they represent.
25. For example the majority of lumber mill owners of the Mississippi
River were successfully organized into an effective group by the Weyer-
hauser interests in the 1870's.
26. While during the period 1946 to 1949, 495 groups reported expendi-
tures under the Federal Lobby Act passed in 1946, it has been estimated
that there are some 1800 permanent national organizations. See GRAVES,
ADMINISTRATION OF THE LOBBY REGISTRATION PROVISIONS OF THE LEGISLA-
TIVE REORGANIZATION ACT of .1946. (Washington, Government Printing
Office, [1950].)
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In addition to groups of this nature, there are also many self-
styled "educational" associations which have been formed within
recent years. These organizations profess to be independent,
objective, fact-finding and fact-disseminating bodies. For the
most part they are not concerned with direct appeals to govern-
ment for special favors but instead they concentrate on the
molding of public opinion on national issues.27 Despite their
claims to objectiveness,; it is significant to note that the
financial support of many such organizations comes primarily
from a given branch of our economy,2 9 and that the tone and
conclusions of each analysis prepared by such groups follows
a definite political pattern. 0
27. For information on the nature and scope of the activities of or-
ganizations of this type, see the following releases issued by the Buchanan
Committee in 1950: 4 Hearings: National Economic Council, Inc.; 5
Hearings: Committee for Constitutional Government; 6 Hearings: Ameri-
cans for Democratic Action; 7 Hearings: Public Affairs Institute; 8 Hear-
ings: Foundation for Economic Education; 9 Hearings: Civil Rights
Congress.
28. The Foundation for Economic Education in a booklet describing its
activities stipulates that the foundation is a "non-political research
and educational institution." It further adds that the sole purpose of the
foundation "is a search for truth in economics, political science, and re-
lated subjects," 8 Hearings, supra note 9, at 4. The American Enterprise
Association states that its purpose is to: ". . . inquire into and appraise
current economic and social questions as they bear on public policy, and to
disseminate its findings, so as to further public understanding of such
matters. As an educational and non-partisan body, the association en-
deavors to be completely impartial and objective in its work. The as-
sociation takes no stand either in favor of or against any proposed legisla-
tive measures." Quoted in H. R. REP. No. 3233, 81st Cong., 2d Sess., 7
(1950).
Dewey Anderson, Executive Director, The Public Affairs Institute, also
asserts that his organization is an independent research organization.
See 7 Hearings, supra note 9, at 3-9. William H. Patterson, executive
secretary, Civil Rights Congress, said the Congress was formed to defend
constitutional rights, and it was not a lobbying organization. See 9 Hear-
ings, supra note 9, at 7.
29. The Public Affairs Institute for example receives its primary sup-
port from organized labor. 7 Hearings, supra note 9 see especially pages
62-65; the Committee for Constitutional Government, the National Economic
Council, and the Foundation for Economic Education rely mainly on
contributions from businessmen and corporations. See: H. R. REP. No.
3138, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 9-23 (1950). Also see the reports of the hear-
ings conducted by this committee, parts 4, 5 and 8. The American Enter-
prise Association frankly admitted that its program "has been carried on
with the support of some 400 business firms and individuals." H. R. REP.
No. 3233, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1950).
30. It should be stressed that no particular "political shade" has a
monopoly on these groups. The views of the extreme left are represented,
for example, by the Civil Rights Congress; liberal sentiment is expressed
by the materials distributed by the Public Affairs Institute; conservative
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Organization for purposes of influence is then the funda-
mental factor which distinguishes current methods of soliciting
governmental favors. This feature of course facilitates the co-
ordination of pressure tactics and the cultivation of public senti-
ment to an extent not formerly possible. The means by which
these things are accomplished are worthy of further observation.
While the direct contact approach of earlier years continues
to be the primary means of making influence effective, organiza-
tion has made it possible to give a scientific touch to this mode
of operation. It is now possible for example to have each or
most congressmen contacted directly by influential individuals,
members or friends of a given organization, who live in the
district represented by the legislator. 31 It is possible also to
secure spokesmen before legislative committees who come from
many geographic areas, thus lending breadth and political attrac-
tiveness to their appeal, and by proper briefing from organiza-
tional headquarters it is possible to coordinate their views and
facts. If the group is effectively organized at the lower level, it is
a comparatively simple matter also to produce a flood of tele-
grams and letters which deluge legislators at strategic times.
Illustrations of these techniques may be selected from the
legislative campaigns of any number of organizations whose
activities have been investigated by the Buchanan Committee.
The U. S. Savings and Loan League for example makes a prac-
tice of having Savings and Loan representatives present as wit-
nesses at committee hearings to exhibit the interest of that group
whenever any bill which might conceivably affect them comes
under discussion.32 As part of their plan to make their presenta-
tion effective they occasionally hold briefing sessions to enable
witnesses, as stated on one occasion, to "avoid some of the more
critical questions which are likely to be propounded and to
answer some of them which can be easily and conveniently an-
swered.133 The Civil Rights Congress has on several occasions
attempted to impress Congress by mass migrations to Washing-
ton at strategic times for the purpose of showing support for a
views are expressed by such organizations as the Foundation for Economic
Education and the Committee for Constitutional Government.
31. For illustrations see H. R. REP. No. 3139, 81st Cong., 2d Sess., 73,
94 (1950).
32. Ibid.
33. H. R. RFP. No. 3139, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 127 (1950).
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given cause. 4 The National Association of Real Estate Boards
according to the report issued by majority members of the
House Committee investigating lobbying has systematized "all
means of direct contact between its members and legislators
more completely than any other group appearing before this
committee." ' This report goes on to describe the Association's
activities in the following terms:
This group conducts letter and telegram campaigns. It
also prepares, sometimes on request, specific letters which
local members transmit to their Senators and. Representa-
tives. The association has developed through its local mem-
ber boards remarkably extensive lists of congressional "con-
tacts," persons who are expected to wield particular influ-
ence with the Representative or Senator from the district
or State concerned. There is, among others, a list of "spe-
cial contacts" for the House Banking and Currency Com-
mittee; another for the Senate Banking and Currency
Committee; a third for the House Rules Committee; and
a fourth which is labeled "Key Senate Phone Contacts."
When a pressure campaign reaches the critical stage, when
a final ounce of effort may be the margin between success
or failure, the "contact" swings into action.3G
While normally requests for letters and telegrams to local
units and individual members are in themselves sufficient stimu-
lus to produce the desired response,37 on occasion various pres-
sure groups have found it necessary to inject a more artificial
note to their method of approach. For example, the National
Association of Real Estate Boards in its campaign to defeat
rent control sent the following memo to realtors throughout the
nation:
Suggested paragraphs for use in letter to Congressmen
(note.-be sure to change form and ideas into your own
words, rearrange, omit some facts, and add personal experi-
ences) :
Dear : We have both heard a lot of com-
plaint about rent control and OPA generally....
34. 9 Hearings, supra note 9, at 10-11.
35. H. R. REP. No. 3138, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 24-25 (1950).
36. Ibid.
37. For example, the secretary of the Oklahoma Savings and Loan
League proudly reported to Morton Bodfish, Chairman of the Executive
Committee of the U.S. Savings and Loan League that: "Starting Thursday
morning, June 16 (1949), Friday, June 17, and Saturday, June 18, we are
getting out 1000 letters and telegrams a day to the Oklahoma congressional
delegation." H. R. REP. No. 3139, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 461 (1950).
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Recently I met with some of our good friends, including
, and we discussed what best should
be done to correct the injustices being practiced in the name
of controlling rents.
Our decision was to start here in (city) a
movement to force the OPA Administrator to allow adjust-
ment in rents of at least 15 percent. This should be done
this fall in order to give all of us plenty of time to arrange
the adjustments. I am taking this up with (name of friend)
of (another city) also and may
discuss it with others to see whether we might spread the
movement over the country.
Before doing that, however, I want to ask you if you will
(sponsor) (support) such an amendment to the price-con-
trol law. If you will do so, I will try to get such a move-
ment started in other sections immediately.
Here are some of the reasons why I think this should be
done - and they apply only to rents:
(State in your own words some of the "15 facts"
which you think will appeal to him most.)
I am asking others of the group to write you about this,
and I will telephone you later, we are anxious to start the
movement with your help.
(Signed) 3-
On occasions, the evidence shows, the synthetic nature of
appeals similar to this is readily detected by legislators and their
suspicions are naturally aroused as to whether they are hear-
ing the genuine wishes of their constituents.39 The commonness
of the practice suggests, however, that frequently the pressure-
inspired nature of these messages can be successfully concealed
and that sheer volume of letters and wires does in some instances
influence legislative action.
38. H. R. REP. No. 3138, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 24 (1950). In this con-
nection a letter sent to Morton Bodfish (U. S. Savings and Loan League)
is also of interest. This letter in part said: "Every effort was made by
me . . . and several other interested parties here to flood both Kerr and
Cooley with letters, telegrams, post cards, and long-distance calls relative
to our opposition to socialized public housing legislation. We carefully
arranged so that telegrams went at different times, carrying varying
messages. The letters that were prepared in my office for other people
were prepared on different typewriters, and in every case, on their station-
ery or, in the case of individuals, on blank stationery." H. R. REP. No.
3139, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 375-376 (1950).
39. For illustration see, Coffin, The Slickest Lobby, 162 NATION 340
(Afar. 23, 1946). In this same vein Congressman Halleck of Indiana ob-
served that one well-reasoned letter might do more to persuade the judg-
ment of a legislator than would the sheer volume of letters he received.
1 Hearings, supra note 9, 20-21.
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This fact suggests another characteristic which typifies cur-
rent means of translating group wants into governmental ac-
tions. It is a characteristic which while it is part and parcel
of the organizational movement is none the less distinctive in
itself. This feature is an increased consciousness of the neces-
sity of cultivating "grass roots sentiment," of selling to the
public the concept that the wants of a given group are its wants
and wishes. While it would be a misstatement to assert cate-
gorically that special interests of former years were completely
indifferent to the degree of public support which they could
solicit,", it is safe to state that it is only within the past two
decades that economic groups have assiduously mobilized their
resources and utilized current communication facilities for the
purposes of winning or neutralizing public sentiment.
This struggle to win the minds needless to say requires vast
expenditures. An exact total of the sums thus spent is impossible
to obtain and estimates are singularly unreliable, for the means
of cultivating popular support are numerous and methods by
and through which appeals are made frequently successfully
hide the power behind them. An inquiry sent by the Buchanan
Committee to approximately 200 corporations, labor unions and
farm groups did, however, solicit from them statements to the
effect that during the period January 1, 1947 to May 31, 1950
they had collectively spent over $32,000,000 for purposes, di-'
rectly or indirectly, of influencing legislation.41 This figure in
itself illustrates beyond question that the pressure potential of
our many economic units is not insignificant.
One of the principal means by which the concept that "our
battle is your battle" is broadcast is through the distribution
of booklets, pamphlets, reprints of articles and speeches, and
books. Costs of disseminating these materials are often greatly
reduced, thanks to the second class mailing rights, and the pri-
40. For example, the lumber interests of Eau Claire, Wisconsin during
the 1860's and '70's when they were fighting desperately to secure a fran-
chise from the legislature succeeded in raising public sentiment in the
community to a point where they gave considerable financial help to aid
the legislative efforts of the millowners. See Wis. ASSEMBLY J., Appendix
(1872).
41. H. R. REP. No. 3138, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1950). For detailed
reports containing a breakdown of the amounts contributed by each firm or
group reporting see: H. R. REs. Nos. 3238 and 3137, 81st Cong., 2d Sess.
(1950).
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vate use of the franking privilege.42 Illustrations of mass dis-
tribution are numerous. The United States Savings and Loan
League circulated 600,000 copies of a specially prepared pam-
phlet entitled "Government Ownership of Homes." 43 The Public
Affairs Institute, an organization which draws its primary sup-
port from labor circles, distributed to farm groups, Congress-
men, trade associations, religious organizations and schools over
14,400 copies of a study entitled the "Role of Collective Bargain-
ing in a Democracy." 44 The Foundation for Economic Education,
an organization of conservative leanings, though it professes
to be an objective educational group, disseminated almost
4,000,000 booklets and pamphlets carrying such titles as "So
You Believe in Rent Control," "Two Paths to Collectivism" and
"Crisis According to Plan.145
While the activities of these groups are by no means inconse-
quential, they are dwarfed by those of the Committee for Con-
stitutional Government, for this organization between the years
1937 and 1944 distributed "Eighty-two million pieces of litera-
ture-booklets, pamphlets, reprints of editorials and articles,
specially addressed letters and 760,000 books."4 Evidence that
the efforts of this particular group have not diminished is seen
in the fact that since its publication in 1949 the Committee
has circulated "close to 700,000" copies of John T. Flynn's
book The Road Ahead.47
Needless to say the newspaper and radio facilities have not
been overlooked in the battle to control "grass roots sentiment."
While the direct approach through the medium of advertising
is extensively used in these means of mass communications,
news releases and editorial support are considered even more
effective and important. To facilitate such publicity local units
are urged to contact radio stations and newspapers in their
area requesting that their activities and views be given promi-
nent display.48 Canned releases and editorials play no small
42. 2 Hearings, supra note 9, 199; 5 Hearings 96, 113; 6 Hearings 100.
43. H. R. REP. No. 3139, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 616 (1950).
44. 7 Hearings, supra note 9, 47.
45. 8 Hearings, supra note 9, 46.
46. H. R. REP. No. 3138, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 31 (1950).
47. Ibid.
48. For example, the Housing Research director for the United States
Savings and Loan League wrote a memorandum to its local units pertaining
to government housing. One of the suggestions concerned with publicity,
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part in this picture. In this connection it is of interest to note
the statement made to the House Committee investigating lobby-
ing by Professor Stephen K. Bailey, author of the book entitled
Congress Makes a Law, which is an analysis of the various
pressures at work in shaping the "Full Employment Act" of
1946. In his testimony, Bailey observed:
The one thing I should like to point out here is the close
connection-or parallelism of ideas-which exists between
the opinion leaders in big business and opinion centers in
agriculture. It seems to me significant that the Natibnal
Association of Manufacturers sends editorial material all
ready to print to 7,500 rural weekly newspapers and that
it maintains a service called farm and industry-a release
which it sends to 35,000 farm leaders.
When I studied the press clippings on the full-employment
bill, I counted 72 editorial comments in 50 small-town dailies
and weeklies. Of these 72 editorial comments, all except 5
were hostile to the original bill. I think it is interesting
to note some of the following "coincidences": On February
20, 1945, without credit line, editorials attacking the bill
appeared in the Zanesville (Ohio) Times Recorder and the
Cheyenne (Wyo.) State Tribune. These editorials were
identical. On September 7, 1945 the Clarksburg (W. Va.)
Exponent published an editorial against the bill. On Sep-
tember 10, 1945, the identical editorial appeared in the Lima
(Ohio) News. On September 7, 1945, identical editorials
quoting anti-full employment bill material prepared by the
Committee for Constitutional Government appeared in the
Macon (Ga.) Telegraph and the Cumberland (Md.) Times. 49
An essential part of this never-ending campaign of "educa-
tion" is solicitation by the management and members of one
group for the support of the directing forces and associates of
other groups. To solicit such backing invitations are sought
to speak before civic groups, church gatherings, veterans or-
ganizations, business clubs, and labor unions.50 In most instances
stated: "The facts about Government housing are invariably newsworthy,
and direct news releases-such as Poor People Not Living in Public Hous-
ing, Veterans Barred From Government Housing by Illegal Tenants, City's
Public Housing Costs Taxpayers $100,000,000--will be welcomed by the local
papers. Speeches, magazine articles, and paid advertisements can also be
enployed to get the story before the public." H. R. RuP. No. S139, 81st
Cong., 2d Sess. 817 (1950).
49. 1 Hearings, supra note 9, 35-86.
5o. In the memorandum referred to in note 48, supra, it was recommended
that local affiliates of the U. S. Savings and Loan Association get coopera-
tion in their study of Government Housings from: Veterans' organizations,
home builders, Real Estate boards, banks and other financial institutions,
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obtaining a hearing is not difficult, for frequently representa-
tives of the special interest factions who wish to sell their point
of view will be members of other organizations and thus in a
position to aid in the selection of speakers and in arranging the
agenda. In fact, part of the program of creating sentiment is
the placing by one group of its men on strategic boards and
policy forming committees of other organizations. Thus, for
example, the U. S. Savings and Loan League exhibited proper
appreciation of the fact that its past president was elected as a
director of the U. S. Chamber of Commerce and they were
naturally pleased that this representative was helpful in getting
the Chamber to endorse the position of the League", in respect
to certain legislation. Correspondence from local associations
shows that the U. S. Savings and Loan League is also successful
at the local level in getting endorsement from U. S. Chamber
and other groups via the same means. Naturally such support-
resulting as it does in resolutions, more telegrams, more letters,
press releases and other publicity-gives the desired impression
of popular support. In many instances it would seem, however,
that this appearance of added strength is illusory for the reason
that often it is, because of duplication of membership, but the
voice of a given special interest group using several different
labels.
While further examples and details of modern pressure tech-
niques could be cited, such a recitation would serve no further
purpose. The preceding account illustrates the primary objective
of this article-namely to reveal that current attempts to in-
fluence government are carried on by well coordinated forces,
primarily organized as economic blocs, which forces utilize with
considerable effectiveness modern means of communication and
cultivate to an extent heretofore unknown "grass roots" sup-
port for their particular points of view.
It has been argued in defense of organized pressure blocs that
they represent the means by which minorities may be heard. 2
While this argument unquestionably has some merit and is
not to be discounted, it is also true that the proportions to
taxpayers' organizations, home and property owners' associations, civic and
business clubs.
51. H. R. REP. No. 3139, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 532 (1950).
52. For an interesting and able defense of lobbying see Bellows, In
Defense. of Lobbying, 172 HARPERS 96 (1935).
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which modern techniques of pressure mobilization have de-
veloped have caused other minorities possessing less "know-how"
and fewer resources to be completely submerged and thus more
ineffective. What is even more serious is the fact that the forces
which can be successfully organized by certain minorities are
occasionally the means by which the voice of the inarticulate
unorganized majority is lost and unheeded. The sheer volume
of propaganda that certain groups generate and the variety of
means by which they disseminate their point of view results at
times in the undue magnification of the popular desire for certain
measures, 3 and as a consequence the actual wishes of the great
mass of people are at least temporarily ignored.
It is also asserted that organized economic blocs represented
by well-informed spokesmen serve as an essential source of
information to legislators and administrators. The value of
this service is not to be discounted and there appears to be no
adequate substitute for it on the current political horizon. It
is unfortunate, however, that much of this information is
touched with bias. It is difficult to have it otherwise, for the
success of the group organization and more particularly the
future of the group's spokesman depends upon how skillfully
facts are marshaled and presented, not for purposes of achieving
an objective appraisal but rather for purposes of selling a point
of view. Further, pressure groups-because their views must
have mass appeal-frequently disguise and dress their facts
and arguments in slogans and cliches. Thus one hears on a
maze of issues talk of the "American way," "free enterprise,"
"inalienable rights," "socialism," "ccommunism," "economy"
and a vast variety of other terms which too often tend to hide
facts and divert attention from the true merits of a measure
a particular group is advocating or opposing.
One may well sympathize with the statement contained in a
report submitted by the Buchanan Committee which observed,
53. Professor Hadley Cantril, Princeton University, in his testimony
before the Buchanan Committee mentioned that in 1940 a comparison was
made between opinion as expressed in congressional mail relative to the
Burke-Wadsworth Selective Service Act and public opinion as determined
by careful survey. Some 13,000 letters, the total sent to five senators,
were obtained. Ninety percent of these were against the bill. At the same
time the public opinion surveys showed 70 percent of the people were for
the bill. I Hearings, supra note 9, 20.
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"One of the greatest difficulties under which Congress works
is a scarcity of objective information."' 4
As previously observed, the organization of one group leads
to the creation of other groups. If it could be assumed that
all blocs thus formed had equal facilities for organization and
that one power could successfully curb the selfishness and ex-
cesses of others, it would be safe to accept without alarm the
phenomenon of economic groupism. As it is, it must be recog-
nized that this balancing of interests is not automatic. It is a
condition which must be consciously obtained by legislators
aware of the realities of political life, by executives and ad-
ministrators uncommitted, to the extent to which this is feasible,
to any given minority, and by judges who are conscious that
their decisions are not made in a political economic vacuum.
Recognizing that information on the activities of pressure
forces that carry their campaign directly to the legislators is
highly desirable, some thirty-eight states and the federal govern-
ment have enacted lobbying laws designed to procure such
data.55 These measures vary greatly in their definition of lobby-
ing, in the information which they require and in their enforce-
ment provisions.5 6 Despite these differences it may be stated
quite categorically that they have one characteristic in common
-that is that all such measures have singularly failed to ac-
complish their desired objective.5 7 In some instances this in-
effectiveness appears to be the result of loose and ambiguously
worded statutes, particularly in respect to definitions of lobby-
ing;58 in others to a failure to provide for any effective means
of enforcement;59 in still others to a general indifference to the
objectives of the law.60
54. H. R. REP. No. 3233, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1950).
55. See testimony of Dr. Belle Zeller, professor of political science,
Brooklyn College, before the Buchanan Committee, 1 Hearings, supra
note 9 at 59, 78-79.
56. For current data and observations concerning regulation of lobby
groups, see: Futor, An Analysis of the Federal Lobbying Act, 10 FED. B. J.
366 (1949); Zeller, The Federal Regulation of Lobbying Act, 40 Am. POL.
Scr. REv. 239 (1948); Comments: 38 CALiF. L. RMV. 478 (1950); 47 COL.
L. REv. 98 (1947); 56 YALE L. J. 304 (1947).
57. See Dr. Zeller's testimony before the House Select Committee on
Lobbying, 1 Hearings, supra, note 9, especially pages 71-77.
58. Dr. Zeller stated to the committee: "Few statutes provide clear,
specific and meaningful definitions of what constitutes legitimate lobbying."
Ibid.
59. A comment on lobbying printed in 56 YALE L. J. 304, 315 (1947)
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While for the most part the purposes sought to be accom-
plished by these measures is commendable and much could be
achieved by redrafting them and by implementing their en-
forcement provisions, it should be recognized that such enact-
ments represent an extremely narrow approach to the problem.
Designed as they primarily are to turn the spotlight of publicity
on those who carry their campaign directly to the legislature,
they fail for the most part to take account of "grass roots"
activities-activities which constitute the essential characteristic
of modern pressure forces. This is not to suggest that a measure
could be devised which would sucessfully regulate and gather
adequate information on this means of soliciting support, for
the techniques employed are many, the difficulties of distinguish-
ing between bona fide educational endeavors and the peddling
of propaganda numerous and real. What is more any such regu-
lation would give rise to serious and genuine questions of con-
stitutionality.61
contains the following observation: "A major weakness of all state statutes
is the lack of adequate enforcement provisions. Although criminal sanc-
tions are imposed for violation of the registration requirements, no special
agency is charged with investigating either the accuracy or inclusiveness
Df the registration lists and financial statements. That Attorneys General
have exhibited no particular desire to bring actions except in the case of
flagrant violations accompanied by wide publicity is indicated by the wide
variation in the number registering from state to state and year to year,
and the absence of entries of large sums in expense accounts. A conclusion
that the law is broken with impunity is inescapable. (Footnotes omitted)."
60. This general indifference is reflected in the fact that very few
prosecutions have occurred under the various lobbying laws. In a state-
ment submitted to the Buchanan Committee, Dr. Zeller observed: "There
are a number of States who have not had a single prosecution under the
lobbying laws. There are only three reported decisions relating to the
State lobby acts, two in Kentucky and one in Missouri (Commonwealth v.
Aetna Life Insurance 263 Ky. 803, 93 S. W. 2d 840, 1936) (defendant
acquitted); Campbell v. Commonwealth, 229 Ky. 264, 17 S. W. 2d 227,
1929 (conviction reversed); State v. Crites, 227 Missouri 194, 209 S. W.
863, 1919 (lobbying act held to violate a constitutional provision that no
bill should contain more than one subject expressed in its title.) On March
7, 1950, the Wisconsin Supreme Court unanimously upheld as constitutional
the State's lobbying law, thus enabling the district attorney to proceed
with an action involving revocation of a lobbying license for alleged false
statements in the filing of expenditures." I Hearings, supra note 9, 76.
The Wisconsin case to which reference is made is State v. Hoebel,
256 Wis. 549, 41 N.W.2d 865 (1950).
To date there has also been one reported prosecution under the Federal
Lobby Law, U. S. v. Slaughter, 89 Fed. Supp. 205 (D. D.C. 1950); 89
Fed. Supp. 876 (D. D.C. 1950). (Court found defendant not quilty).
61. As a recent comment so truly observed in discussing the work of the
Buchanan Committee, "Much of the investigation was conducted within
the shadow of alleged constitutional objection." These objections pertained
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If despite these difficulties a measure can be drafted which
succeeds in collecting data that could be kept current for pur-
poses of having a constant picture of pressure activities, the
major problems would yet remain unsolved. All who participate
in the democratic process would still be confronted with the
necessity of securing an adequate balance of economic forces
by curbing excessive privilege, and by rectifying burdens dis-
proportionately distributed. This balance can only be secured
and maintained by self-discipline on the part of the members
who make up the economic groups, on the part of those, including
lawyers, who serve as their organizers and spokesmen, and by
a general public aroused to an awareness that the general wel-
fare of all is only preserved by conscious intent and informed
endeavors.
both to proposals referring to the regulation of lobbying and to the work
of the committee itself. Comment, 18 U. OF CHI. L. REV. 647, 653-654(1950).
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